Abstract.
Introduction
Lattices are periodic arrangements of discrete points. Apart from their wide-spread use in pure mathematics, lattices have found applications in numerous other fields as diverse as cryptography/cryptanalysis, the geometry of numbers, factorization of integer polynomials, subset sum and knapsack problems, integer relations and Diophantine approximations, coding theory. In this paper, we survey the main tools which can be used to the verify vulnerabilities of different cryptosystems.
Lattice reduction is concerned with finding improved representations of a given lattice using algorithms like LLL (Lenstra, Lenstra, Lov´asz) reduction .There are some versions for lattice reduction, but people are using the LLL algorithm for theoretical and practical purposes. It is a polynomial time algorithm and the vectors are nearly orthogonal. In section II, we briefly discuss the complexity issues of LLL algorithm and its properties. In section III, we discuss the subset sum problem and how lattice reduction has been used to get a solution in some instances. This technique, in turn can be applied to break knapsack cryptosystems like Merkle-Hellman knapsack cryptosystem. In section IV, we discuss Univaraite polynomial congruence problem and how lattice reduction was used to get a solution. This technique, in turn can be applied to check vulnerabilities of RSA cryptosystem. In section V, we discuss simultaneous Diophantine approximation problem and vulnerabilities of knapsack cryptosystem.
Terminology

Lattices
A lattice is a discrete subgroup of ℝ . Equivalently, given ݉ ≤ ݊ linearly independent vectors ܾ ଵ , ܾ ଶ , ܾ ଷ , … , ܾ ∈ ℝ , the set ℒ = ℒሺܾ ଵ , ܾ ଶ , ܾ ଷ , ⋯ , ܾ ሻ = ሼ∑ ߙ ܾ ୀଵ |ߙ ∈ ℤሽ, is a lattice. The ܾ are called basis vectors of and ℬ = ሼܾ ଵ , ܾ ଶ , ⋯ , ܾ ሽ is called a lattice basis for ℒ. Thus, the lattice generated by a basis is the set of all integer linear combinations of the basis vectors in ℬ. The determinant of a lattice, denoted by ‫݈ݒ‬ሺℒሻ is the square root of the gramian determinant݀݁‫ݐ‬ ଵஸ,ஸ 〈ܾ , ܾ 〉, which is independent of particular choice of basis. A general treatment of this topic see [1] .
Lattice reduction
Lattice reduction techniques have a long tradition in mathematics in the field of number theory. The goal of lattice basis reduction is to find, for a given lattice, a basis matrix with favorable properties. Usually, such a basis consists of vectors that are short and therefore this basis is called reduced. Unless stated otherwise, the term "short" is to be interpreted in the usual Euclidean sense. There are several definitions of lattice reduction with corresponding reduction criteria, such as Minkowski reduction, Hermite-Korkine-Zolotareff reduction, Gauss reduction, Lenstra-Lenstra-Lov´asz (LLL) reduction, Seysen reduction. The corresponding lattice reduction algorithms yield reduced bases with shorter basis vectors and improved orthogonality; they provide a tradeoff between the quality of the reduced basis and the computational effort required for finding it. Here we consider the LLL reduced, because there is a polynomial time algorithm exists and vectors are near orthogonal and the first vector solves the approximate SVP problem. For good survey on lattice reduction algorithms refers [4] .
LLL reduced
The following LLL reduced version given by Lenstra, Lenstra, Lovasz [1] , [2] , [3] . 
LLL Algorithm
The Lenstra -Lenstra -Lov´asz (LLL) algorithm [1] [2] [3] is an iterative algorithm that transforms a given lattice basis into an LLL-reduced one. Since the definition of LLL-reduced uses Gram-Schmidt process, the LLL algorithm performs the Gram-Schimdt method as subroutine.
LLL Algorithm with Euclidean norm:
Input 
Properties of LLL algorithm:
Let ܾ ଵ , ܾ ଶ , ܾ ଷ , ⋯ , ܾ be an LLL reduced basis for a lattice ℒ ⊂ ℝ . Then 
Solving subset sum problem of low density:
Let ሼܽ ଵ , ܽ ଶ , ܽ ଷ , … , ܽ ሽ be distinct positive integers. The subset sum problem is, given an integer s obtained as a sum of elements ܽ , to find ‫ݔ‬ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ for ݅ = 1,2, ⋯ ݊ such that ∑ ܽ ‫ݔ‬ = ‫.ݏ‬ The density of S is defined to be ݀ = ୫ୟ୶ ሼ୪୭ |ଵஸஸሽ
. The subset sum problem is ࣨ࣪-complete.
LLL algorithm solution
Using LLL algorithm one can find a particular short vector in a lattice [4] . Since the reduced basis produced by LLL algorithm includes a vector of length which is guaranteed to be within a factor of 2 షభ మ of the shortest non-zero vector of the lattice. In practice, however, the LLL algorithm usually finds a vector which is much shorter than what is guaranteed. So the LLL algorithm can be expected to find the short vector which yields a solution to the subset sum problem provided that this vector is shorter than most of the non zero vectors in the lattice.
Justification
Consider the matrix ሺ݊ + 1ሻ * ሺ݊ + 2ሻ matrix ‫ܤ‬ = If the density of the knapsack set is small, i.e the ܽ are large, then most vectors in L will have relatively large lengths, and hence y may be unique shortest non zero vector in L. If this is indeed the case then there is a good possibility of the algorithm finding a basis which includes this vector. Above algorithm is not guaranteed to succeed. Assuming that the LLL algorithm always produces a basis which includes the shortest non zero lattice vector, then algorithm succeeds with high probability if the density of the knapsack set is less than 0.9408.
Application
This is most powerful general attack known on knapsack encryption schemes [5] . It is typically successful if the density of the knapsack set is less than 0.9408. This is significant because the density of a Merkle-Hellman knapsack [6] set much be less than 1, since otherwise there will be many subsets of the knapsack set with the same sum, in which case some cipher texts will not be uniquely decipherable. Also, since each iteration in the multiple-iterated scheme lowers the density, this attack will succeed if the knapsack set has been iterated a sufficient number of times. Similar techniques have since been used to break most knapsacks schemes that have been proposed, including the multiple-iterated Merkle-Hellman scheme.
Solving modular equations
It is easy to compute the integer roots of a polynomial in a single variable over the integers. But the related problem of solving modular equations can be hard. We have different tools to solve ݂ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ = 0. But one cannot solve ݂ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ = 0 ሺ݉‫݀‬ ݊ሻ efficiently. The solution for the above equation was proposed by Coppersmith in the year 1997 [7] . Here we present simple version of Howgrave-Graham [8] .
Let ܰ be an integer and ݂ ∈ চሾ‫ݔ‬ሿ be a monic polynomial of degree ݀. Set ܺ = ܰ భ ିఌ for some ߝ ≥ 0. Then given 〈ܰ, ݂〉, one can efficiently find all integers ‫ݔ|‬ | < ܺ satisfying ݂ሺ‫ݔ‬ ሻ = 0ሺ݉‫݀‬ ܰሻ using the LLL algorithm. This fact claims the existence of an algorithm which can efficiently find all roots of ݂ modulo ܰ that are less than ܺ = ܰ భ . As ܺ gets smaller, the algorithm's runtime decreases. This theorem's strength is the ability to find out all small roots of polynomials modulo a composite N. The idea is simply reducing the root finding problem in modular equations to the case of root finding equations over the integers. Thus one has to construct from the polynomial ݂ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ with the root ‫ݔ‬ ≤ ܺ modulo ܾ a polynomial of ݂ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ which has the same root ‫ݔ‬ by applying standard root finding algorithms to ݂ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ. But how can be transform ݂ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ into ݂ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ?. This transform is exactly the core of the Coppersmith's method. He defines the matrix which has the elements of the form ݃ , ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ = ܰ ି ‫ݔ‬ ݂ ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ for ݅ = 1, ⋯ ݉ and some choice of ݆ and it has a root ‫ݔ‬ ‫݀݉‬ ܾ . Then every integer linear combination ݂ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ = ∑ ݃ , ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ, ܽ , ∈ চ , of polynomials in G also has the root ‫ݔ‬ ‫݀݉‬ ܾ . Our goal is to find among these linear combinations one which has the root ‫ݔ‬ not just modulo ܾ but also over the integers. For this one can choose coefficients of ݂ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ satisfies the relation ݂ሺ‫ݔ‬ ሻ < ܾ . This is where the lattice reduction algorithm such as LLL comes into the picture. The first vector of a reduced basis satisfies the above inequality.
Application 1: Attacking RSA with small e by knowing parts of the message:
Suppose that ݉ = ‫ܯ‬ + ‫ݔ‬ for some known part ‫ܯ‬ of the message and some unknown part ‫ݔ‬ ≤ ܰ భ . Now one can recover ݉ from above scenario. This situation occurs in the case of stereotyped messages. Let ሺܰ, ݁ሻ be a public key in RSA public key cryptosystem [7] . 
Application 2: Repeated message and short pad attack
Consider the situation when Bob sends two messages to Alice that only differ by a small amount. Also assume that sender is using a exponent 3. In this case ‫ܯ‬ It is not obvious that recovering M from the knowledge of x, but this is true due to clever trick of Franklin and Reiter [9] . To explain this in our case let ݉ be a polynomial indeterminate and calculate gcd (݉ ଷ − ܿ ଵ , (݉ + ‫)ݔ‬ ଷ − ܿ ଶ ) using the Euclidean algorithm. It can be shown that the result of this gcd will be the linear polynomial ݉ − ‫,ܯ‬ and hence we discover ݉.
5.Simultaneous Diophantine Approximation
Simultaneous Diophantine approximation is concerned with approximating a vector ቀ 
Justification:
Apply LLL algorithm to above matrix and let the rows of the matrix ‫ܣ‬ be denoted by 
Application
Given the public knapsack set, this technique finds a pair of integers ܷ 
Conclusions:
In this survey paper, we have discussed some Cryptanalytic attacks using some tricky lattice techniques. First one, we solved subset sum problem of low density. Then we observe vulnerabilities of Merkle-Hellman knapsack cryptosystem which is based on subset sum problem. Second one, we solved univaraite modular polynomial equations. Using this we check the pitfalls of RSA function in two cases. Finally we discuss the problem of Simultaneous Diophantine Approximation problem. Again we observe vulnerabilities of Merkle-Hellman Cryptosystem. All are implemented in NTL number theory [12] library maintaining by victor shoup.
